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Random number generation (RNG) is a complex cognitive task for human subjects,
requiring deliberative control to avoid production of habitual, stereotyped sequences.
Under various manipulations (e.g., speeded responding, transcranial magnetic stimulation,
or neurological damage) the performance of human subjects deteriorates, as reflected
in a number of qualitatively distinct, dissociable biases. For example, the intrusion
of stereotyped behavior (e.g., counting) increases at faster rates of generation.
Theoretical accounts of the task postulate that it requires the integrated operation
of multiple, computationally heterogeneous cognitive control (“executive”) processes.
We present a computational model of RNG, within the framework of a novel,
neuropsychologically-inspired cognitive architecture, ESPro. Manipulating the rate of
sequence generation in the model reproduced a number of key effects observed
in empirical studies, including increasing sequence stereotypy at faster rates. Within
the model, this was due to time limitations on the interaction of supervisory control
processes, namely, task setting, proposal of responses, monitoring, and response
inhibition. The model thus supports the fractionation of executive function into multiple,
computationally heterogeneous processes.
Keywords: random number generation, executive function, cognitive control, cognitive architecture,
computational model, supervisory system
INTRODUCTION
In a random number generation (RNG) task, subjects are
instructed to randomly produce items from a given response set
(e.g., single-digits 0–9), as if selecting and replacing items from a
hat. The task typically requires subjects to produce a sequence of
arbitrary length (e.g., 100 digits). Despite its apparent simplicity,
the task is surprisingly complex, and appears to require the co-
ordination of a diverse set of cognitive processes in order to
generate an apparently random sequence.
When human-generated sequences are analyzed according to
information-theoretic criteria for randomness, performance is
typically poor, with such sequences exhibiting a number of sub-
stantial biases. Perhaps surprisingly, however, such biases show
considerable regularity and robustness across subjects andmodal-
ities. For example, subjects strongly avoid consecutive repetitions
(e.g., Baddeley et al., 1998; Towse, 1998), even though in ide-
ally random sequences of sufficient length, such repetitions occur
with a non-negligible expected frequency—for a response set
of 10 items, approximately one-tenth of responses should be
consecutive repeats.
One possibility is that participants are poor at generating
random sequences because they have an erroneous concept of
randomness1, an inability to perceive whether one’s own sequence
1We take an erroneous concept of randomness to include both biases
reflecting lay-beliefs about randomness (e.g., the gambler’s fallacy), or due to
ill-specified instructions (see Nickerson, 2002 for a review of both issues).
is sufficiently random, or both (see Bar-Hillel and Wagenaar,
1991, for a review, but see Nickerson, 2002 for a critical treat-
ment). This may well contribute to a normative, base-level bias,
but the biases shown by participants are reliably modulated by
experimental manipulations (e.g., concerning the rate of produc-
tion, the concurrent performance of different secondary tasks,
or the response modality). Additional factors therefore appear
to underlie the biases shown across experimental conditions. In
fact, an analysis of the production mechanisms involved in RNG
suggests the involvement of multiple, functionally separable but
interdependent processes. For example, Baddeley et al. (1998)
propose that RNG involves, minimally: maintaining and updating
a representation of previous responses; the selection of responses
from an internal representation of the response set; and the sup-
pression of habitual sequences such as counting. The involvement
of multiple heterogeneous processes is supported by evidence
from behavioral experiments (e.g., Baddeley et al., 1998; Towse,
1998; Cooper et al., 2012), TMS (e.g., Jahanshahi et al., 1998),
neuroimaging (Jahanshahi et al., 2000), and individual differences
studies (e.g., Miyake et al., 2000) and there is an apparent
consensus that these processes correspond with putative executive
functions, including working memory monitoring/updating, task
setting, and response inhibition.
While such executive functions have been extensively studied
in numerous experimental paradigms, and specified in com-
putational terms (e.g., Gilbert and Shallice, 2002; O’Reilly and
Frank, 2006; Boucher et al., 2007; Brown et al., 2007), modeling
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has tended to focus on simple experimental tasks intended to
isolate or decompose single executive functions. Computational
accounts of more complex tasks which seek to show how more
complex behavior is regulated as a synthesis of a number of such
executive functions operating in concert have been infrequent
(although, see Sood and Cooper, 2013).
The present article presents a model of the RNG task within
a theoretically motivated executive function architecture, and
evaluates the model against existing empirical data sets. Of
the remainder of this paper, the Measures of Randomness
and Behavioral Effects section reviews how biases in random
sequences have been assessed and how they have variously been
manipulated in behavioral experiments. The Existing Models of
RNG and their Limitations section discusses cognitive theories of
RNG. In An Architecturally GroundedModel of RNG, we present
a computational model of the task, grounding the model within
the specification of a complete, task-general executive architec-
ture. The Simulations section presents four simulations in which
the model performs RNG at various rates. Together, the simula-
tions demonstrate how some of the characteristic effects of mod-
ulating generation rate in human subjects might be accounted
for in terms of an automatic contention-scheduling system which
produces habitual behavior, regulated by rate-limited supervisory
processes. The Results section presents simulation results. The
Discussion section presents a general theoretical discussion of the
simulations and the presented architecture. The Supplementary
Material contains implementational details and parameters for
the model2.
MEASURES OF RANDOMNESS AND BEHAVIORAL EFFECTS
The randomness of a sequence may be assessed in a number of
ways. In an ideally random sequence of infinite length, the overall
frequency of responses should be equal. Biases away from such
equality are commonly assessed using R, an information theo-
retic index of redundancy which is derived from the number of
occurrences of each response (Baddeley et al., 1998). However,
a sequence that simply cycles repetitively through the response
set would achieve minimal redundancy whilst being entirely pre-
dictable, suggesting that additional criteria are required. One
alternative is the RNG score (Evans, 1978), which measures
the relative usage of all consecutive two-response combinations
(digrams), which should also be equal in an infinitely long,
ideally random sequence. Hence, a higher RNG score can be
thought of as reflecting overall overuse of certain digrams. While
the RNG score gives an overall assessment of sequential bias,
other indices are sensitive to specific stereotyped sequences. For
example, when using a familiar response domain such as let-
ters (e.g., Baddeley, 1966) or digits (e.g., Jahanshahi et al., 1998)
it appears that subjects must inhibit overlearned continuations,
such as cycling responses in alphabetical order, or counting, and
a number of metrics have been used to specifically assess such
2The simulations described in this paper were written in C, using the GTK+
graphical toolkit for interface functions. All model code and simulated data
are available from the authors. To compile and run the simulations GCC ver-
sion 3.0 and GTK+ version 2 or similar are required. Both are freely available
with any modern GNU/Linux distribution.
habitual sequence biases. Adjacency (A), is simply the proportion
of responses that reflect adding or subtracting one to the previ-
ous response (±1 associates), while count scores (CS1, CS2) are
weighted to the length of a subsequence, and defined respectively
as the summed square of the length of each sequence that con-
sists of ±1 or ±2 associates (Spatt and Goldenberg, 1993). Such
measures do not assess the regularity with which responses are
re-used. The distribution of the gaps between successive instances
of the same response may be calculated, and the average (usually,
the median) repetition gap (RG) assesses the tendency of subjects
to cycle through the response set with a greater predictability than
ideally random sequences (Towse and Neil, 1998). Thus, no single
metric provides a complete assessment of randomness.
A large number of indices may be calculated from an arbi-
trary sequence, and compared with the expected values associated
with true randomness (generally, calculated empirically through
repeated computer generation of pseudorandom sequences or
random number tables) for an assessment of bias. A crucial ques-
tion is the extent to which indices of randomness dissociate.
When such varied metrics are obtained from written sequences
generated by human subjects, a factor structure is found that
shows individual differences in human biases different to that
from ideally random sequences of the same length. Ginsburg
and Karpiuk (1994) suggested a three-factor model of subject
biases, including factors they named Cycling (loading primarily
on median RG), Seriation (with strong factor loadings on indices
of adjacent responses, similar to CS1 and A, and unequal digram
usage, similar to RNG), and Repetition (with strongest factor
loading on the number of consecutive repetitions). This sug-
gested that underlying the biases evident in randomness indices
is a consistent structure, relating to the operation of various
underlying cognitive processes, the efficacy of which differs across
individuals.
Subsequent factor analyses of verbal responses to an RNG
task (e.g., Towse and Neil, 1998; Miyake et al., 2000) confirmed
these findings, although with an additional factor, Equality of
Response Usage, which loaded primarily on redundancy (R).
Miyake et al. hypothesized that the suppression of prepotent
responses (identified as Seriation by Ginsburg and Karpiuk, 1994)
requires response inhibition, while equality of response usage
requires the updating of memory representations of previous
responses. Indeed, relating variation on the Equality of Response
Usage factor to differences in working memory updating is con-
sistent with the absence of such a factor in the analysis of Ginsburg
and Karpiuk (1994) which, being based on a written version of
the task, obviated the need for subjects to use memory to reg-
ulate response equality. Miyake and colleagues found the best
fitting structural equation model indeed linked the two factors to
latent variables which putatively indexed the respective executive
functions, as derived from a selection of simple executive tasks.
Miyake et al.’s study provides additional support for the
hypothesis that different indices of randomness do indeed index
different control functions (rather than, for example, different
conceptions of randomness). It is difficult to see why individual
differences in biases underlying random generation should corre-
late with latent factors identified with cognitive control functions,
if biases in random generation are merely due to limitations in the
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ability to perceive randomness. Additionally, the study suggests
plausible candidate functions underlying two of the main dimen-
sions of bias in random generation performance. However, it has
a number of limitations: the data are purely correlational; the fit
of the authors’ favored model (with single path from each latent
variable to randomness factors) is only marginally better than the
fit of several alternative models; and the model does not provide
a mechanistic account of task performance in terms of cognitive
processes (see Cooper et al., 2012, for a more detailed discussion).
Consistent with these findings from individual differences
methodologies, experimental studies have found that various
indices of randomness are differentially sensitive to behavioral
manipulations. One commonly reported finding is the effect
of varying the rate of response generation, with an increase in
generation rate producing an increase in the tendency to use
counting as a stereotyped strategy (indexed by CS1 or A scores).
It appears that at faster rates, subjects have difficulty suppress-
ing overlearned, habitual sequences (Towse, 1998; Jahanshahi
et al., 2000). In a PET study, the left dorso-lateral prefrontal
cortex (LDLPFC) appeared to be critical for such suppression
of habitual sequences, with the region more active when sub-
jects performed RNG compared to counting (Jahanshahi et al.,
2000). Furthermore, activation in the region appeared to be
related to a behavioral measure of stereotypy, with the faster
rates of generation producing an increase in CS1 scores and a
decrease in LDLPFC activation. Jahanshahi and colleagues inter-
preted this as reflecting the breakdown of this region’s ability to
suppress habitual responses at fast rates of generation. This con-
clusion was supported by findings from a second study using
Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation (TMS) over the region, which
produced a similar increase in CS1 without having a significant
effect on other randomness indices for equality of response usage
(R) or cycle length (RG) (Jahanshahi et al., 1998). These results
are paralleled by neuroimaging findings from another genera-
tion task—verbal fluency—in which the same region was active
for word production, but not word comprehension (Frith et al.,
1991). Taken together, these findings suggest that the role of the
LDLPFC in generation tasks is not specific to random sequences,
but instead related more generally to response selection and the
suppression of bias. This evidence appears incompatible with
an explanation of random generation bias purely in terms of
an erroneous conception of randomness, and again points to a
control-process account of random generation.
Varying other task parameters has tended to modulate alter-
native indices of randomness. Varying the size of the response set,
for example, appears to affect the subject’s ability to achieve equal
use of each element of the response set, although this effect disap-
pears in modalities where the responses are represented visually,
or when a visible representation of the response set is provided
(Towse, 1998). From this evidence, it appears as though equal
use of the response set is dependent on the subject representing
the response set, either externally, or internally, where the ability
to keep track of previous responses appears limited by memory
constraints.
An alternative approach to the investigation of the cognitive
processes underlying random generation has been to use a dual-
task methodology, based on the assumption that the performance
of a simple task should lead to performance impairments on
a concurrent complex task through a reduction in the capac-
ity of cognitive processes which are shared between the tasks.
Specifically, the findings of Miyake et al. (2000) suggest that
concurrent performance of a simple response inhibition task
should increase prepotent associates bias, while a concurrent
memory monitoring/updating task would increase equality of
response usage bias. Inconsistent with this prediction, however,
in a visual/spatial version of the task, Cooper et al. (2012) found
prepotent associates indices (including RNG and A) were most
biased when RNGwas paired with a 2-back task (held to primarily
involve workingmemorymonitoring/updating), while equality of
response usage (R) was affected both by concurrent performance
of a 2-back task and a digit-switching task (held to require task
switching).
In summary, while an erroneous conception of randomness
might explain the existence of normative bias, such limitations
are inadequate to explain findings from three main strands of
evidence. Firstly, individual differences studies suggest that biases
are regular across subjects, and appear to correlate with putative
executive functions. Secondly, neuroimaging and TMS data sug-
gests that the degree of bias in a sequence is modulated by activity
in a specific region of prefrontal cortex, which is also linked to
response production, but not perception, in a generation task
which does not involve randomness. Thus, the control processes
involved in controlling bias appear more general than would be
suggested by specific limitations in a concept of randomness.
Thirdly, a limited concept of randomness cannot explain why
biases are modulated by behavioral manipulations (e.g., gen-
eration rate, concurrent performance of a secondary tasks) or
procedural variations (e.g., response modality, response set size),
in such a way as to produce qualitatively different patterns of
behavior3. While the evidence reviewed thus far is consistent with
the hypothesis that random generation performance requires
multiple co-ordinated executive functions, it does do not yet
present a coherent picture of how the cognitive processes interact
during task performance, or which biases reflect which execu-
tive functions. One aim of the present work is to present such a
theoretically-motivated account.
EXISTING MODELS OF RNG AND THEIR LIMITATIONS
Baddeley et al. (1998) suggested that the process of random
generation can be understood by analogy with other genera-
tion tasks, such as category generation. In such a task, subjects
typically make use of strategies or schemas to generate a clus-
ter of related items (e.g., for the category “animals,” typical
schemas might include “household pets” or “farmyard animals”),
switching schemas when they cease to produce novel responses.
Random generation is held to involve similar use of retrieval
schemas. In the case of digit generation, schemas might include
habitual schemas such as counting or reciting telephone num-
bers; or deliberate strategies such as iteratively subtracting two.
3It is plausible, however, that limitations in applying a concept of randomness
to an extended sequence, in a perception task, is subject to the same capac-
ity limitations as sequence production, and we regard this interpretation as
essentially compatible with the model of production presented here.
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However, in contrast to category generation, to comply with
the requirement that the sequence appear random, subjects
are required to frequently switch between different generation
schemas. According to this model, distinct cognitive processes are
responsible for monitoring responses before they are generated,
inhibiting conspicuously non-random responses, and switching
between alternative generation schemas. The schema switching
process must be capacity limited, or ideal random generation
could be achieved by deliberate switching of schemas on every
response. Impairment in performance could result from three
possible sources: the availability and capacity to switch between
retrieval schemas, the capacity to monitor and inhibit prior plans
or responses if they would produce an insufficiently random out-
put, and the capacity to maintain a mental representation of
previously used schemas. The processes of monitoring, inhibi-
tion, and schema switching were ascribed to the central executive
of the multicomponent working memory model (Baddeley, 1986,
2000).
Jahanshahi et al. (2000) proposed a similar model, also based
on extrapolating the processes thought to be involved in category
fluency. In this model, an associative network represents response
alternatives as a series of nodes, with node activation spreading
through mutual, variably weighted excitatory connections. The
strongest weights are between neighbor pairs (representing ±1
associates) with the next strongest between alternate pairs, such
that the unrestrained output of the network resembles counting.
An active controller comprises multiple control processes, includ-
ing inhibitory modulation of response alternatives, monitoring
output to detect violations of task rules, and access to informa-
tion in long termmemory (e.g., task rules, a subjective conception
of randomness, etc.). The authors propose that the mechanism
for the control of responses is the active inhibition of a prior
response’s neighbor nodes (or strongest connections), to suppress
inappropriate, habitual responses. Inability to produce a random
sequence is, as in Baddeley et al. (1998), due to capacity limita-
tions of the active controller, in particular at the fastest rates of
generation.
One limitation of the models of Baddeley et al. and Jahanshahi
et al. is that neither is fully specified in computational terms. The
main aim of the present article is therefore to present a compu-
tationally explicit account of the contribution of specific control
functions to the generation of random numbers by human sub-
jects. This approach offers advantages beyond the above verbal
models. It makes explicit how varied randomness indices are
dependent on the interaction of specific control processes; and
it shows how the interaction of such control processes might be
affected by task factors such as generation rate.
AN ARCHITECTURALLY GROUNDED MODEL OF RNG
While it would be possible to develop a computationally com-
plete model of RNG based on the above verbal description, there
is much to be gained by developing the model within the more
constrained theoretical framework of a cognitive architecture. A
cognitive architecture specifies at a gross level a theory of the
organization of the processing subcomponents that make up a
cognitive system (in this case, the human cognitive system). By
developing a model within an architecture, the model inherits
constraints from the architecture (Newell, 1990) and when mod-
els of a range of tasks are developed within a single architecture,
constraints from the full range of tasks can help to further specify
elements of the architecture, thereby effectively resulting in addi-
tional constraints on each specific model (but see Cooper and
Shallice, 1995).
At the time of writing, the most well-developed cognitive
architecture is the ACT-R (Adaptive Control of Thought—
Rational) architecture of Anderson and colleagues (e.g.,
Anderson, 2007), though there are a range of proposals in
the literature (including most notably Soar, e.g., Newell, 1990;
Laird, 2012; and EPIC, Meyer and Kieras, 1997). Here we
present a novel architecture—the Executive Subprocess (ESPro)
architecture—which is based on theories of the organization of
the “central executive” (Baddeley, 1996) and the break-down
of executive functioning following neurological damage (e.g.,
Norman and Shallice, 1986; Shallice et al., 2008). We return to
the relation between the ESPro architecture and other extant
cognitive architectures in the general discussion.
THE EXECUTIVE SUBPROCESS (ESPro) ARCHITECTURE (VERSION 1.0)
Figure 1 shows the components of the proposed ESPro archi-
tecture (version 1.0) and their potential interactions. The figure
adopts the conventions of the COGENT modeling environment
(Cooper and Fox, 1998; Cooper, 2002), whereby a cognitive
system is decomposed into interacting components (generally
buffers, shown as rounded rectangles, and processes, shown as
hexagonal boxes), with interactions shown by different types of
arrow (for sending messages to processes or querying the content
of buffers). In order to develop a fully operational computa-
tional model from a COGENT diagram it is necessary to specify
the properties of the component buffers (e.g., whether and how
capacity limitations and decay might operate) and the rules of
operation of the component processes.
ESPro assumes a basic distinction between routine or over-
learned behavior and non-routine behavior (see Norman and
Shallice, 1986). The former is assumed to be the product of a
schema-based system (referred to as contention scheduling and
shown in the lower portion of Figure 1) while the latter arises
from the modulation of that schema-based system by higher cog-
nitive processes (referred to collectively as the supervisory system
and shown in the upper portion of Figure 1). Many of the compo-
nents of the ESPro architecture have a generic, task independent,
operation. Consider first the contention scheduling components.
Current Set is a buffer that contains a representation of the task
set or schema that, at a given point in time, controls behav-
ior. (In the case of a random generation task this might be a
counting schema.) Apply Set operates by applying the schema
contained within Current Set to the current stimulus (which is
assumed to be contained in the Sensory Stores), potentially draw-
ing upon information stored in Working Memory and Response
Buffer. The effect of this is to activate a representation of a poten-
tial response within Response Nodes. Propose Response monitors
the activation of elements in Response Nodes, and when one
exceeds a selection threshold the corresponding item is copied
into Response Buffer. Generate Response monitors Response
Buffer. When it detects a putative response it generates it (e.g.,
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FIGURE 1 | Components of the Executive Subprocess (ESPro)
architecture. Hexagonal boxes represent processes that generate output
while rounded rectangles represent buffers that store representations
(possibly with associated activations). Pointed arrows between boxes show
message passing. Arrows with flat heads represent the reading of
information from buffers by processes.
articulating the word or pressing the corresponding response
key) and stores the response thus generated in Working Memory.
These components thus implement a system for the generation of
habitual or schema-driven behavior.
The operation of Apply Set is based on the contention schedul-
ing system described by Norman and Shallice (1986), see also
Cooper and Shallice (2000). It assumes that routine behavior
involves application of behavioral routines (schemas) to per-
ceptual input (i.e., the contents of Sensory Stores). Responses
generated in this way must be stored in Working Memory (or
some short-term buffer) as many routine sequential tasks con-
sist of actions that are dependent on previous actions, even when
those previous actions have no persistent sensory consequences.
For example, when adding sugar to a hot beverage it is necessary
to record in some way when sugar has been added as once the
sugar has dissolved it cannot serve as a perceptual cue. Similarly
in the case of RNG it is necessary to record, at least temporar-
ily, each response, as schemas such as counting need to know the
previous response in order to generate the next putative response.
Empirical and neuroimaging studies involving tasks such as
the stop signal and Go/NoGo tasks (e.g., Verbruggen et al.,
2006, 2008; Swick et al., 2011) and the task switching paradigm
(e.g., Philipp et al., 2007) imply that response selection and
response generation are separate processes. This is reflected
within the ESPro architecture by the distinction between the
Propose Response and the Generate Response processes. Once
a response is proposed, it is temporarily stored in the Response
Buffer prior to being generated. A putative response can then be
withdrawn or withheld prior to generation if supervisory pro-
cesses (specifically Monitoring) determine that the response is
inappropriate in the current context.
The remaining components of the architecture allow for
the modulation of routine behavior in non-routine situations.
Monitoring detects when a proposed behavior fails to meet task
requirements4 . In the case of random generation this process
must detect when a putative response is “insufficiently random,”
as described below. When Monitoring detects such a failure, it
inhibits production of the proposed response and triggers gen-
eration of a more appropriate response. It does the latter by
inhibiting the current schema (i.e., the contents of Current Set).
This in turn triggers Task Setting to generate and install an alter-
native schema in Current Set. Routine operation (via contention
scheduling) may then resume, with the alternative schema (hope-
fully) leading to the proposal of a more appropriate or acceptable
response.
A MODEL OF RNGWITHIN THE ESPro ARCHITECTURE
Applying the ESPro architecture to a specific task such as ran-
dom generation requires specifying the operation of the two key
task-specific components of the architecture: Task Setting and
4More generally, Monitoring may also make use of a forward model (not
shown in Figure 1) to compare anticipated sensory (including proprioceptive
and perceptual) feedback with actual sensory feedback. While this form of
monitoring is important within the generalized ESPro architecture it is elided
here for reasons of simplicity.
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Monitoring. The role of Task Setting is to propose and instate a
new schema or task set whenever the process detects that there
is no schema currently controlling behavior (i.e., Current Set is
empty). The operation of the process depends on the available
schemas (which is task specific), and in highly complex tasks the
process may involve problem solving and planning. This level of
complexity is not required, however, for the random generation
task, and in the current model we explore the assumptions that
(a) the available schemas may be effectively approximated by a
set of schemas that can transform (by addition or subtraction
of a fixed quantity) any response into any other response, and
(b) Task Setting selects from these schemas stochastically, with
“repeat response” having a much smaller probability of selec-
tion (e.g., of 0.01, assuming a response set size of 10) than all
other schemas, which have equal probability of selection (e.g., of
0.11, given the response set size of 10). Thus, Task Setting imple-
ments a bias away from selection of the schema supporting repeat
responses, but beyond this it is not biased in its schema selection.
Within the general architecture, the Monitoring process is
required to detect when a planned response (i.e., a putative
response that has been entered into Response Buffer) is inap-
propriate, and hence should be inhibited in favor of a more
considered response. In the context of the random generation
task, Monitoring must determine when a putative response is in
some sense insufficiently random. On detection of such a puta-
tive response it should be removed from the Response Buffer and
the schema that led to its generation should be deselected (i.e.,
removed from Current Set). Presumably there are individual dif-
ferences in what one considers “insufficiently random.” For the
purposes of the current simulation we assume that criteria for
rejection of a response can be abstractly represented with a sim-
ple set of if/then rules. Specifically, the model treats a putative
response as insufficiently random in the event of any of three
conditions: (a) the model can recall having recently produced the
response (i.e., there is a record of it in Working Memory); (b) the
response is one more or one less than the previous response; or
(c) the response together with the previous two responses forms
a sequence with equal intervals between each (e.g., 2, 5, 8 or 9, 5,
1). These three rules can be seen as implementing an avoidance of
repeat responses, counting, or repeated use of a single schema,
respectively, and are thus consistent with the verbally specified
models of Baddeley et al. (1998) and Jahanshahi et al. (2000).
The only further details required to specify the model of ran-
dom generation concern the behavior of the Working Memory
and Response Node buffers5. Working Memory is a short-term
store that must be capable of holding an ordered set of recently
generated responses. The information in Working Memory is
used by Apply Set to generate a putative response by applying
5The architecture as shown in Figure 1 includes three other buffers. Response
Buffer and Current Set are assumed for the purposes of this implementa-
tion to be capable of holding exactly one element. It is moreover assumed
that decay does not operate on these buffers. Current Set is a proxy for the
schema network of Cooper and Shallice (2000) implementation of contention
scheduling, with the contents of Current Set corresponding to the selected
schema within that implementation. The current simulations do not make
use of sensory feedback, so the properties of Sensory Stores are not relevant
here.
the current schema (stored in Current Set) to the recollection of
the previous response (as recovered fromWorking Memory), and
by Monitoring to check whether a putative response, once gen-
erated, is sufficiently random (as above). The model is agnostic
about how the short-term storage aspects of Working Memory
are achieved. Thus, the buffer might have limited capacity (such
that when capacity is exceeded older elements are over-written)
or decay might operate on its contents (with the likelihood of
an element becoming inaccessible increasing with time or with
the number of elements stored in the buffer). In the simula-
tions reported below we consider two distinct implementations
of Working Memory.
The Response Node buffer is an interactive activation net-
work with one node for each possible response. Nodes compete
for activation according to standard interactive activation princi-
ples with lateral inhibition between nodes ensuring that no more
than one node is highly active at any time. Apply Set operates by
exciting the node corresponding to the favored response, but this
is modulated by associative excitation within the network (so if
the node for “3” is active it will excite the nodes for its closest
associates, “2” and “4”). Propose Response detects when a node’s
activity exceeds a threshold. A representation of that response is
then placed into Response Buffer and the corresponding node in
Response Nodes is inhibited. Activation dynamics is governed by
the interactive activation equations of Cooper and Shallice (2000)
with a threshold of 0.80.
AWORKED EXAMPLE
An example of processing in themodel is as follows. Let us assume
that Working Memory contains three previous responses, 0, 2,
and 5, while Current Set contains the schema +3. At this stage,
the most active response node is 6, due to the spreading of activa-
tion from the previously active node, 5, and the activation of this
node laterally inhibits all other response nodes. However, within
the contention scheduling system, Apply Set excites the 8 node
on each cycle, as a result of applying the +3 schema to the pre-
vious response in working memory (5). Activation of the 6 and
8 nodes is competitive, and in this example, the 8 node “wins,”
crossing an activation threshold first. Propose Response then cre-
ates an instance of the “8” response in the Response Buffer and
correspondingly inhibits the “8” Response Node.
Once a response has been added to the Response Buffer,
the model is ready to produce it at any appropriate time. In
the model, this time is given by the number of cycles specified
by the Generation Rate parameter. In the interim, however,
the contents of the Response Buffer are open to inspection by
Monitoring. To continue our example, Monitoring matches the
“8” response against the contents of working memory, according
to one of its rules specifying an insufficiently random response
(in this instance, reflecting repeated usage of the +3 schema)
and performs two actions: firstly, inhibiting the activation of
the “8” response within the Response Buffer6, secondly, clear-
ing the schema from Current Set. Next, Task Setting sets a new
6Note that while the proposed response is inhibited, it remains in the
Response Buffer. Thus, it could still be generated if the generation period
expires, but another response has not yet been proposed.
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schema (−2) which Apply Set uses to excite the “3” response
node. Meanwhile, the “6” response has remained relatively active
from the earlier stages of processing, and crosses the activation
threshold first, and is transferred to the Response Buffer.
This cycle of proposing responses, monitoring, task-setting,
and proposing new responses continues until a either a response is
found which does not trigger any Monitoring rules, or the model
runs out of time and is forced to generate whatever response is
in the Response Buffer (i.e., in our example, if the generation
period expired here, the next response to be generated would be
“6”). Thus, at longer rates of generation, the model may proceed
through more iterations, and is more likely to generate a response
fully consistent with its concept of randomness.
SIMULATIONS
MODEL IMPLEMENTATION
A consistent finding of empirical studies of RNG is that varying
the rate of generation leads to a substantial decrease in ran-
domness at the fastest rates of generation, characterized by an
increased tendency to employ the simplistic, overlearned strategy
of counting. This effect is held to be the result of a breakdown
in control processes underlying random generation (Baddeley,
1996; Towse, 1998). Why might this occur at faster rates of
generation? We note two distinct possibilities. Firstly, a break-
down may be directly related to rate of generation; for example,
if the elimination of stereotyped responses depends on tempo-
rally extended supervisory processes, increased bias may be a
direct result of limited processing time. Alternatively, the break-
down of control processes may be indirectly related to generation
rate via an increase in generic cognitive load, or a reduction in
the availability of specific cognitive resources, as a result of the
increasingly demanding nature of the task at faster rates of gener-
ation. Although the present model architecture could be adapted
to represent either proposal, the following simulations explore the
behavioral implications of the first, more parsimonious, hypothe-
sis: that decreased randomness and increased sequence stereotypy
is a direct result of time limitations on supervisory processes.
While certain aspects of the model, such as the architecture of
the supervisory system, represent core theoretical claims; other
components are included only to provide a complete, executable,
computational model. We argue that the precise instantiation
of working memory is such an implementational detail, and
that a range of implementations of working memory would
produce a broadly similar qualitative pattern of behavior. To
substantiate this argument, two alternative implementations of
working memory are presented (simulations 1A, 2A vs. 1B, 2B).
Additionally, two alternative implementations explore how the
effect of generation period on one specific dependent variable,
RNG, may arise from individual differences in schema selection
biases (simulations 1A, 1B vs. 2A, 2B). Table 1 shows the four sets
of simulations.
Working memory implementation
While a wide range of theoretically-motivated models of work-
ing memory have been proposed (for a review, see Miyake and
Shah, 1999) the present implementation of the RNG model aims
to avoid commitment to any specific implementation. Thus, two
Table 1 | Overview of simulations.
Working memory implementation
Functionally ACT-R—inspired
abstract
Schema
selection
Equiprobable
(identical subjects)
Simulation 1A Simulation 1B
Idiosyncratic
(variation between
subjects)
Simulation 2A Simulation 2B
alternative implementations of the model are presented, offer-
ing a functionally abstract working memory system (Simulations
1A and 2A) and a theoretically-driven implementation adopt-
ing a number of the assumptions and features of the ACT-R
architecture (Simulations 1B and 2B).
A functionally abstract implementation of working memory.
For the purposes of simulations 1A and 2A, working memory
is implemented as a buffer which contains a temporally-ordered
list of representations of previous responses. This implementation
differs from the standard buffers available within the COGENT
framework7, in that it is assumed that the likelihood of a repre-
sentation decaying is a function of its position in the buffer, rather
than the elapsed time since it was added.
This assumption is based on empirical findings that repetition
suppression appeared to occur as a function of the number of
intervening items, orthogonal to generation rate, and not directly
related to the amount of time that had elapsed since its produc-
tion (Towse, 1998), in contrast to findings on the recency effect
in typical working memory paradigms (e.g., Page and Henson,
2001). Indeed, the assumption that the decay of memory for
previous responses is orthogonal to generation rate is critical to
model performance. Possible mechanisms for this phenomenon
are briefly discussed in the following section.
In implementational terms, working memory implements the
assumption that a normalized activation level is distributed across
the contents of working memory, with new items in work-
ing memory “stealing” activation from existing items such that
an item’s activation is approximately inversely proportional to
its position in the buffer. This intuitive description is formal-
ized in Supplementary Material (Working memory activation
equations).
An implementation of working memory inspired by ACT-R.
While the previous implementation aims to abstract away
from the algorithmic detail of working memory as a model-
ing convenience, it may be argued that its implementation is
overly simplified and lacks theoretical motivation. It implements
memory representations as all-or-none—if they are present in the
7The COGENT framework offers a range of off-the-shelf buffer implementa-
tions via parameters specifying access, capacity and decay characteristics suit-
able for implementing paradigmatic storage components (such as short-term
limited capacity components and long-term unlimited capacity components;
see Cooper, 2002).
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buffer, their instantaneous retrieval is guaranteed; however on
decaying they are irretrievably lost. It might be argued that it is
implausible that a monitoring process accesses the most recent
and most distant items in working memory equally easily; in
demanding working memory tasks requiring continual updating
such as the N-back task, for example, cognitive load increases
as more items are required to be maintained in working mem-
ory (Fletcher and Henson, 2001). An alternative implementation
of working memory aims to demonstrate that the behavior of
the model is not dependent on the simplified working memory
assumptions made in simulations 1A and 2A. Here, we assume
that retrieval of older items in the buffer should take more time.
Hence at faster rates, the monitoring system will be restricted to
checking responses against fewer previous responses in working
memory.
One available implementation of this idea is that used
by ACT-R to model retrieval from declarative memory (e.g.,
Anderson, 2007). Within the ACT-R architecture, memory rep-
resentations are activated portions of long-term memory, with
the activation value decaying over time. Thus, in contrast to
the previous implementation, items do not decay from working
memory—each possible response is represented once. The prob-
ability of successfully retrieving memories, and the time required
for retrieval, are functions of an item’s activation. Adopting these
assumptions offers some independent, theoretically validated,
constraints for working memory, while testing the claim that the
specific implementation of working memory is incidental to its
qualitative behavior.
Our implementation of activation in working memory departs
from the ACT-R algorithms in one important respect. We assume,
for the purposes of retrieval latency and probability equations,
that activations of working memory items are relative to mean
activation in the buffer, rather than absolute values, in order to
ensure working memory decay is independent of generation rate,
and so as to stabilize the capacity of working memory between
the start and end of the task. This additional assumption is sim-
ilar to that adopted in the functionally abstract implementation
of working memory above. However, in the canonical imple-
mentation of base-level learning in ACT-R, successful retrieval of
chunks in memory increases their level of activation, a mecha-
nism not implemented in the present model. If slower rates of
generation permit more memory retrievals as a by-product of
more thorough monitoring, it seems reasonable that this mech-
anism might counterbalance decaying activation to produce WM
decay that is orthogonal to generation rate, as has been assumed
here. Future experimental and computational work might fruit-
fully explore whether working memory decay is indeed orthog-
onal to generation rate in the RNG paradigm, and whether this
can be accounted for by models which propose active mainte-
nance as a by-product of monitoring, or a dedicated process
(e.g., verbal rehearsal), although such work is outside the scope
of the present study and these points will not be discussed
further.
Schema selection
In the model, schemas represent a probability distribution of
all potential responses, given a previous response. For sim-
plicity, however, simulations 1A and 1B essentially model the
performance of a single subject, where the selection of all non-
repeat schemas by Task Setting is equi-probable. In human sub-
jects, however, it is plausible that idiosyncratic schema biases are
superimposed over shared schemas such as counting, or count-
ing in twos. This creates issues for empirical assessment of bias.
On one hand, certain indices of randomness, such as associates
scores, reflect population averages (rather than biases evident
in any single individual) and thus may not be sensitive to such
between-subject variability. On the other hand, measures of bias
which are calculated individually for each subject, such as the
RNG score, may reflect idiosyncratic bias that is not evident in
associates scores.
Simulations 2A and 2B therefore model a varied population
of subjects. A unique set of biases is created for each mod-
eled “subject” by scaling each element of the original schema
selection weights matrix with a noise value obtained by sam-
pling from a Gaussian distribution. We predicted that this will
increase individual-specific biases, indexed by RNG scores, with-
out substantial changing mean associate scores (but producing an
increase in their variances).
GENERAL SIMULATION METHODS
Simulation procedure
For each of the four simulation studies, 36 virtual subjects
produced a sequence of 100 responses from the set 0 to 9 (inclu-
sive) for each of six experimental conditions. All sequences were
scored on the standard dependent measures described above,
namely CS1, CS2, R, RNG, and RG. The model includes sev-
eral parameters that are essential to its correct operation (e.g.,
spreading activation in the response nodes) but are of no theo-
retical interest. There are, however, a number of free parameters
that do affect the action of the supervisory processes, includ-
ing: generation period, controlling the number of cycles between
responses; Working Memory decay, which was related to the
per-item capacity of Working Memory; and parameters control-
ling the likelihood of updating Working Memory and of the
Monitoring process firing. Such parameters and their values are
given in the Supplementary Material.
In order to establish baseline performance, model parameters
were hand-set such that the model fit human performance in
a single empirical condition. Simulations then consisted of sys-
tematically manipulating only the generation period parameter,
which was hypothesized to produce similar modulation of ran-
domness indices to varying generation interval in human sub-
jects. This procedure was adopted so as to avoid arbitrary model
performance produced by atheoretically fitting free parameters.
For qualitative examination of model behavior, fine-grained vari-
ations of the generation period parameter were used to graph
how biases in random sequences varied as a function of gener-
ation rate. For quantitative analysis, six regularly-spaced levels of
this parameter were assumed to correspond ordinally to the levels
of generation interval in the target data (i.e., fastest to slowest)
described below. This gives the six experimental conditions for
each virtual subject referred to above.
Target data
The model’s performance was evaluated against data from
published empirical studies of RNG in human subjects.
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Specifically, the model aims to capture the qualitative pattern of
bias modulation when generation rate is varied, which we argue
reflects rate-limitations in executive processes. Unfortunately,
while the behavioral effects of varying generation rate are qual-
itatively robust, dependent variables have not been reported
consistently across published studies, making direct quantitative
comparison between studies problematic. However, at least two
behavioral studies report sufficient indices of randomness to infer
the modulation of underlying biases. Jahanshahi et al. (2006)
reported 11 varied randomness indices in a behavioral replication
of previous studies (Jahanshahi et al., 1998, 2000). Additionally,
Towse (1998) reports the results of statistical tests for the indices
RNG, R, and A, with findings consistent with the Jahanshahi stud-
ies. The qualitative patterns of bias modulation are as follows (see
Table 2). Firstly, both studies report a main effect of generation
rate on measures of consecutive associates (CS1, A), with faster
rates of generation significantly more biased than slower rates.
Secondly, finer-grained analysis of bias in associates usage (e.g.,
Towse, 1998, reproduced here as Figure 2) illustrates the shape
of response biases that contribute to the RNG score. Features of
this data include the typical overproduction of ±1 associates at
fastest rates of generation (i.e., 1.33Hz) and their suppression at
intermediate (0.66Hz) and slower rates (0.33Hz), to the extent
that +2 associates were more frequently used than +1 asso-
ciates at the slowest rate. Unfortunately, formal statistical tests
of these data were not reported. Thirdly, both Towse (1998) and
Jahanshahi et al. (2006) report significant effects of generation
rate on overall associate bias (RNG), although in Jahanshahi et al.
(2006) this was restricted to an increase at only the fastest rate of
generation (2Hz), whereas in Towse (1998) the increase appeared
gradual. No further effects of generation rate are anticipated.
RESULTS
Means of each dependent measure (CS1, CS2, R, RNG, and RG),
together with human data from the target studies, are shown in
Table 2. Data for three representative conditions are presented,
representing slow, medium, and fast rates of generation.
The switch in bias from CS1 to CS2 at slower generates
rates was assessed graphically (cf. Figure 2 for human data and
Figure 3 for simulation data). All simulations reproduced the key
effect, with±1 associates being more frequent than±2 associates
FIGURE 2 | Distribution of difference scores—the difference between
consecutive responses (adapted from Towse, 1998, Figure 2).
Table 2 | Mean and SD for all randomness indices, target data, and simulations.
Generation rate (Towse, 1998), (Jahanshahi et al., 2006), Simulation 1Ac Simulation 1Bd Simulation 2Ae Simulation 2Bf
experiment 1a experiment 1b
CS1 Slow 15.4 (3.6) 11.3 (5.1) 15.0 (5.7) 13.9 (5.5) 22.6 (12.2)
Medium 28.2 (5.1) 28.1 (8.7) 22.8 (7.4) 29.7 (12.0) 28.3 (12.4)
Fast 48.9 (4.6) 58.5 (2.8) 56.7 (16.6) 56.6 (25.7) 57.9 (17.5)
CS2 Slow 27.5 (3.1) 29.6 (6.6) 30.3 (8.4) 32.1 (7.9) 28.2 (8.4)
Medium 33.3 (3.5) 27.7 (5.6) 32.4 (9.0) 30.0 (16.0) 35.4 (16.3)
Fast 30.1 (1.8) 22.6 (7.9) 24.1 (7.1) 23.9 (10.0) 25.4 (11.2)
R Slow 1.03 1.06 (0.40) 1.20 (0.64) 2.52 (1.04) 2.48 (1.40)
Medium 1.24 1.26 (0.72) 1.19 (0.68) 2.04 (1.07) 2.12 (1.22)
Fast 2.10 1.11 (0.67) 0.91 (0.37) 1.45 (0.73) 1.50 (0.68)
RNG Slow 0.255 0.332 (0.009) 0.278 (0.026) 0.260 (0.026) 0.335 (0.031) 0.325 (0.037)
Medium 0.292 0.319 (0.011) 0.257 (0.017) 0.255 (0.027) 0.286 (0.035) 0.294 (0.037)
Fast 0.328 0.349 (0.011) 0.279 (0.029) 0.271 (0.030) 0.279 (0.022) 0.287 (0.040)
RG Slow 7.8 (0.1) 7.5 (0.6) 7.9 (0.5) 7.4 (0.5) 7.7 (0.8)
Medium 8.0 (0.2) 7.4 (0.6) 7.6 (0.4) 7.3 (0.5) 7.4 (0.7)
Fast 7.6 (0.2) 7.9 (6.7) 7.6 (0.4) 7.8 (0.4) 7.7 (0.7)
aGeneration intervals: 3, 1.5, 0.75 s. Raw scores obtained from standardized scores presented in Table 1 by scaling against expected values obtained from a
pseudorandom algorithm.
bGeneration intervals: 3, 1.5, 0.5 s. Data extracted from Figure 1 of Jahanshahi et al. (2006), corrected for set-size to facilitate direct comparison with other data
sets.
cGeneration intervals (model cycles): 33, 18, 4.
dGeneration intervals (model cycles): 33, 18, 4.
eGeneration intervals (model cycles): 34, 23, 12.
f Generation intervals (model cycles): 34, 23, 12.
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FIGURE 3 | Graphs of specific biases at varied generation rates; relative associates usage for simulations 1A (A), 1B (B), 2A (C), 2B (D).
at fast generation rates and vice versa at slower generation rates.
For the remaining dependent measures, one-way independent
measures ANOVAs were performed to test the effect of generation
period across the six generation rates. Minor effects of skew were
disregarded as the sample size was generous (N = 36). In cases of
nonhomogeneous variances, the test reported is Welch’s F.
Consistent with the target data, the effect of generation rate
on CS1 was highly significant in all four simulations, with a very
large effect size [Simulation 1A: F(5,94.47) = 82.43, p < 0.0001,
η2 = 0.64; Simulation 1B: F(5, 96.54) = 65.16, p < 0.0001, η2 =
0.71; Simulation 2A: F(5, 95.53) = 74.62, p < 0.0001, η2 = 0.65;
Simulation 2B: F(5, 97.278) = 29.85, p < 0.0001, η2 = 0.54]. Also
consistent with the target data, the effect of generation rate on
CS2 was significant, but with a much smaller effect size reflect-
ing a more modest increase at intermediate rates [Simulation
1A: F(5, 210) = 5.42, p < 0.0005, η2 = 0.11; Simulation 1B:
F(5, 210) = 4.59, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.10; Simulation 2A: F(5, 210) =
3.60, p < 0.005, η2 = 0.08; Simulation 2B: F(5, 210) = 2.68, p <
0.05, η2 = 0.06]. Thus, the effect of generation rate on CS1 and
CS2 appears robust across all four simulations, suggesting it is
independent both of the specific working memory implementa-
tion (i.e., simulations 1 and 2), and to whether the distribution
of schema selection probabilities is fixed (i.e., simulations 1A
and 2A) or subject to individual variation across subjects (i.e.,
simulations 1B and 2B).
More equivocally, the main effect of generation rate on R and
RNG varied between simulations. For R, the main effect of gener-
ation rate was significant but with a small effect size in Simulation
2B [F(5, 210) = 4.60, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.08] and Simulation 2A
[F(5, 210) = 6.16, p < 0.0001, η2 = 0.13], but not in Simulation
1A [F(5, 97.227) = 0.581, p = 0.71], or Simulation 1B [F(5, 210) =
1.49, p = 0.20]. In both simulations in which a significant effect
was shown, the value associated with ideal randomness lies within
1 SD of the mean in nearly every condition, although an overall
trend is evident in simulation 2A, for less equal usage of responses
at slower rates of generation. For RNG, the main effect of gen-
eration rate was significant in Simulation 1A [F(5, 97.18) = 6.01,
p < 0.0001, η2 = 0.11], Simulation 2B [F(5, 210) = 14.06, p <
0.0001, η2 = 0.25] and Simulation 2A [F(5, 97.24) = 31.64, p <
0.0001, η2 = 0.45], but not in simulation 1B [F(5, 210) = 1.69,
p = 0.14]. An overall trend toward more biased digram usage at
slower rates of generation is evident in simulations 2A and 2B
only. As predicted, between-subjects variability affected the RNG
score, however rather than producing a uniform effect, between-
subjects variability appeared to interact with generation rate, with
a trend toward greater bias at slower rates of generation in B sim-
ulations but not A simulations. Thus, R and RNG both appear
somewhat dependent on between-subjects variability in schema
selection. For R, a small but statistically significant effect was
observed in B simulations only. For RNG, significant effects with
a larger effect size were observed in B simulations, and in A
simulations the effect was either not significant (2A) or significant
but with a smaller size of effect (1A).
Finally, the effect of generation rate on RGwas significant, with
large effect size in Simulation 1B [F(5, 210) = 7.16, p < 0.0001,
η2 = 0.38] and small effect size in Simulation 1A [F(5, 210) =
2.80, p < 0.05, η2 = 0.06], Simulation 2A [F(5, 210) = 3.56,
p < 0.005, η2 = 0.08] and Simulation 2B [F(5, 210) = 6.25,
p < 0.0001, η2 = 0.13].
DISCUSSION
EVALUATION OF MODEL PERFORMANCE
The simulations reproduce the main empirical effect of varying
generation rate reported by Jahanshahi and colleagues: a statis-
tically significant modulation of CS1 score with a large effect
size, reflecting increased use of a “counting” strategy at faster
generation rates. The model also produces a significant effect of
generation rate on CS2 in all four simulations, with much smaller
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effect sizes for this measure. While Jahanshahi et al. (2006) did
not report such an effect, their data does show a corresponding
non-significant trend. As all three studies constituting target data
use a relatively small sample size (between 6 and 15 subjects),
they may lack sufficient power to detect real but small effects,
thus we postulate that this effect would be significant in a behav-
ioral replication with a larger sample size. Qualitatively, the model
produces a distribution of associates that matches the pattern of
data in human subjects, (Figure 3) including a shift from ±1 as
dominant associates at the fastest rates, to a dominance of ±2
associates at the slowest rates. This is achieved by manipulat-
ing only the equivalent model parameter, which controls the
number of cycles of processing between responses. Interestingly,
modulation of generation rate in simulations 1B and 2B pro-
duces a non-monotonic modulation of CS2—the apparent use
of ±2 schemas is greatest at intermediate rates of generation. In
the model, this occurs as a result of a sequential process. A ±1
response becomes highly active and is proposed as a putative
response. This putative response is inhibited by the monitoring
system before it is produced, but meanwhile activation has spread
to the ±1 response’s next neighbor. As spreading activation is
bistable, tending to continue spreading in a single direction (i.e.,
counting either up or down) the next generated response is rea-
sonably likely to be a±2 response. The time required to complete
such a sequence tends to match the period available at interme-
diate rates of generation, thus making ±2 associates (counting
in twos) slightly more likely than other associates. This explana-
tion has a clear analog with the explanation given by Jahanshahi
et al. (2000)—given more time for each response, subjects sup-
press counting in ones, in favor of counting in twos. The peak in
CS2 score matches a non-significant trend reported in Jahanshahi
et al. (2006), and is a prediction that this will reach significance
with a larger number of subjects.
Despite the model’s success in simulating a distribution of
associates consistent with the target data, simulations 1A and 1B
fail to produce RNG scores that are in a characteristically human
range. Yet, the RNG score is an overall measure of associate bias,
reflecting bias away from uniform digram usage. Such a bias
would result from preferred continuations (e.g., a tendency to
follow “3” with “8”). It may seem, therefore, that the simulations’
unrealistic RNG scores in simulations 1A and 1B are inconsistent
with the good fits of the associates graphs. How can they be
reconciled?
The hypothesis explored in simulations 2A and 2B is that
such selection biases are indeed substantial, but vary across
individuals. Consequently, idiosyncratic biases disappear from
specific associates scores when averaged across participants. In
the absence of variance statistics in the target data it is impos-
sible to ascertain to what extent the qualitative shape of the
associates bias is representative of an individual subject or a
group average. Additionally, associates scores (e.g.,+2) are them-
selves a composite of paired responses (e.g., 1–3, 2–4, 3–5),
and variance in the relative preference of different continua-
tions indexed by the same associate (e.g., a bias for 3–5 but
against 5–7) would contribute to a higher RNG index but
not a +2 associate score. Hence, while individual variability in
certain biases may be either invisible in associates scores, or
averaged out across participants in a group mean, bias as mea-
sured through RNG scores is neither. If this is the case, it is
not appropriate to use a model with fixed associate biases to
model such an index of empirical data obtained from a large
sample.
Indeed, generation rate has a much larger effect on RNG in
simulations 2A and 2B than in simulations 1A (where the effect
was significant, but small) and 1B (where the effect was not
significant). Thus, simulations 2A and 2B demonstrate that typ-
ical human values of RNG imply a greater degree of individual
bias than observed in published graphs of sample means (e.g.,
Figure 2). While such graphical representations illustrate com-
monalities in biases across a population, such as the habitual
use of counting, fully assessing the biases of individuals within
a larger sample requires measures such as the RNG index. This
finding has methodological implications for how bias is measured
in empirical studies using the RNG task.
In these simulations, however, the RNG index was modulated
by generation rate in an opposite direction to the human data.
Thus, these simulations do not support the suggestion that in
human subjects, the modulation of the RNG index is a direct
effect of a variable interval in which to propose and evaluate
responses for randomness, as tested in these simulations. Instead,
we speculate that the modulation of the RNG index may reflect
biases in Task Setting which are a result of increased cognitive
load, and are thus an indirect, rather than a direct, effect of
manipulating the generation rate. Incorporating a task selection
bias (e.g., a bias toward more well-rehearsed schemas) mediated
by cognitive load would be within the scope of the proposed
architecture, but remains a hypothesis to be explored in future
empirical and computational modeling research.
For R, similarly to RNG, between-subjects variability in
schema selection bias (i.e., simulations 2A and 2B) interacted with
generation rate to produce a slight modulation in bias. However,
we recall that while Towse (1998) found no effect of generation
rate on redundancy, early RNG studies report increased redun-
dancy at faster rates, the opposite direction of effect to the sim-
ulations (e.g., Baddeley, 1966). Given that R reflects preference
for specific responses, it seems likely to reflect idiosyncratic biases
similar to those for digram usage. Such biases could be mod-
eled by adding noise to individual Response Nodes’ self-excitation
weights, so each subject has a preference for the activation of
certain response nodes (such an arrangement is suggested by
Jahanshahi et al., 1998) however without more robust behav-
ioral data to constrain modeling, we have not attempted this
simulation in the present study.
MODEL SIGNIFICANCE AND RELATION TO VERBAL MODELS OF RNG
To date, we are not aware of other mechanistic computational
accounts of cognitive processes underlying RNG, hence we
cannot quantitatively evaluate model performance in relation to
other models. The operation of the model can be qualitatively
compared to verbal models of RNG, however.
Essentially, the model operationalizes the theoretical proposal
that the generation of random responses involves the suppres-
sion of the most habitual responses, counting in ones (Jahanshahi
et al., 1998, 2000). At slower rates, the model tends to count
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in twos as a result of the proposal, and subsequent suppression,
of ±1 responses before production. However, while Jahanshahi
and colleagues implied that selection occurs in parallel, with a
shift in CS1/2 bias at fastest rates a consequence of a breakdown of
modulatory influence in the DLPFC; in the model reported here
the evaluation and selection of responses takes place serially, in a
temporally extended sequence. A serial mechanism has the benefit
of explaining offset peaks of CS1/CS2 scores at different genera-
tion rates. Under faster rates of generation, there is no breakdown
of modulatory influence—the consequence of faster rates of gen-
eration is an increasingly truncated representation of previous
responses in working memory due to longer retrieval times of
older (less active) items, and thus a progressive impairment in
monitoring effectiveness.
The verbal process model of Baddeley et al. (1998) sug-
gested that schema-based generation of responses is modulated
by inhibition of immediate responses together with a monitor-
ing system that detects and inhibits inappropriate overuse of
schemata. This is a reasonable broad description of the model
operation. In the model, the operation of the supervisory com-
ponents (including the mechanisms of monitoring, inhibition
of proposed responses, switching generation schema, and acti-
vating and proposing an alternative) is constrained by time
available for each generation, which limits the number of pos-
sible alternatives at faster rates. While Baddeley and colleagues
suggested that the schema switching process was the source of
capacity limitations, in the present model the complex behav-
ior of inhibiting an inappropriate response and proposing an
alternative requires time for the interaction of a number of pro-
cesses, including: checking the response against workingmemory;
inhibiting a proposed response; activating an alternative response
node; set switching; and generating a response from a novel
schema. While it has been suggested that the concept of ran-
domness is complex and varies between subjects, the model
implements a rudimentary set of rules used by the monitor-
ing system (informally, inhibiting recently generated responses,
inhibiting responses generated by recently used schemas, and
inhibition of counting) supporting the idea that a sophisticated
conception of randomness is not necessary to produce qualita-
tively human-like behavior. In summary, previous verbal models
of the RNG task are consistent with the model, and the favored
ESPro architecture, although the latter emphasizes the interac-
tive nature of multiple, computationally heterogeneous executive
functions.
We make no strong theoretical commitment to how the con-
cept of randomness is represented semantically. Nevertheless, the
existence of such a concept is assumed by our model: one role
of the monitoring system is to implement such a concept over
successive digit productions. While such a concept may plausi-
bly vary between individuals in sophistication, compared to a
normative standard, the model shows that abstracting such a con-
cept in terms of simple if/then production rules is sufficient to
account for a wide range of observed human biases. One area for
future research might be to evaluate various theories of random-
ness concepts in the model, by changing the rules implemented
by the monitoring system and comparing behavioral predictions.
We believe one advantage of architectural approaches in general
is to facilitate such tests of theory by providing a computational
framework for generating such predictions.
While the RNG task is of intrinsic interest as an index of exec-
utive function, it has been argued here and elsewhere, e.g., that
the suppression of stereotyped, habitual behavior in favor of con-
trolled, deliberately selected sequences of action is characteristic
of a wide range of naturalistic human behavior as well as behav-
ior on complex psychological tasks. From this perspective, RNG is
paradigmatic of complex, self-directed and non-routine behavior.
The model presented here demonstrates that such behavior can
be produced by a functionally decomposed, well-specified, set of
mechanistic processes without recourse to an “homunculus.”
The model thus demonstrates the viability of modeling com-
plex “executive” tasks as the integrated operation of computa-
tionally heterogeneous processes. However, we regard the ESPro
architecture outlined in this model as preliminary. The model
invokes two mechanisms of convenience: setting up and realizing
intentional markers (which is the proper role of further super-
visory processes, hitherto explored in a somewhat separate line
of research), and the role of Monitoring in suppressing inappro-
priate, out-of-bounds responses (e.g., responding “25” when the
task is to produce random numbers ranging from “0” to “9”).
Such responses are occasionally made by normal human subjects.
These errors are reminiscent of certain errors of patients with
prefrontal lesions on naturalistic and lab-based tasks (Shallice
and Burgess, 1991). However, such errors in the RNG task have
not, to our knowledge, been systematically studied, in either nor-
mal human participants or frontal lesion patients. Given the
lack of quantitative data on out-of-bounds rule-breaks, this phe-
nomenon has not been addressed here, but it may indicate a
fruitful paradigm for clarifying the computational functions of
the monitoring process.
While the simulations demonstrate that model behavior is
largely independent of working memory implementation, both
sets of simulations assume that working memory decay is a func-
tion of the number of intervening items, rather than time, yet
this remains to be explained. A possible mechanism was proposed
to be rehearsal as a by-product of memory retrieval by a moni-
toring process, however this remains to be demonstrated within
the model. Indeed, a complete specification of a supervisory sys-
tem architecture should clearly specify workingmemory rehearsal
processes where they integrate with supervisory processes.
THE ESPro COGNITIVE ARCHITECTURE
It was argued above that one advantage of developing a model
within a cognitive architecture was that when models of a range
of tasks are developed within a single architecture, constraints
from the full range of tasks could help to further specify elements
of the architecture, thereby effectively resulting in additional
constraints on each specific model. Yet the ESPro architecture
has not as yet been applied to a wide range of tasks (but see
Sood and Cooper, 2013, for an implementation of the Wisconsin
Card Sorting Task in essentially the same architecture). What
is the evidence in support of the ESPro architecture and why
did we choose to implement the RNG model within this rather
than within a more widely used cognitive architecture such as
ACT-R?
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The primary evidence in support of ESPro is neuropsychologi-
cal. The gross organization of the architecture is based on theories
of cognitive structure developed on the basis of regularities in
the behavior of patients with focal brain injury. In particular,
patients with focal frontal lesions tend to perform well on rou-
tine tasks, where schema-based responding is adequate (Luria,
1966; Shallice, 1988). A second source of evidence for ESPro
comes from cognitive psychological studies of executive function,
and in particular claims of separable or fractionable executive
functions such as set-shifting, response inhibition and memory
monitoring/maintenance (e.g., Miyake et al., 2000). ESPro com-
bines insights from these two areas in a way that is very different
from other cognitive architectures, many of which are devel-
oped by extrapolating single domain theories to wider cognition.
Thus, the Soar cognitive architecture is founded on the assump-
tion that all cognition is a form of problem solving (Newell,
1990), while the roots of ACT-R lie in human associative mem-
ory (Anderson and Bower, 1973). While one could no doubt
develop a model of RNG within, for example, Soar or ACT-R,
it is unclear how the architectural assumptions of such systems
would constrain or inform such a model. Doing so would essen-
tially treat the production system base of Soar or ACT-R as a
general programming language within which to implement the
model. In contrast ESPro provides constraints on the RNGmodel
from the above cited neuropsychological and cognitive psycho-
logical studies. The ESPro architecturemay therefore complement
such existing architectures, by providing a framework for explor-
ing cognitive control (i.e., “executive”) functions, in terms of
computationally well-specified processes with distinct, cortically
localizable neural substrates.
SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL
The Supplementary Material for this article can be found online
at: http://www.frontiersin.org/journal/10.3389/fpsyg.2014.
00670/abstract
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